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The European Commission’s  
CC(C)TB Re-Launch
1 Essential Issues
With its Action Plan for a Fairer and Efficient Corporate Tax System (COM (2015) 302) published 
on 17 June 2015, the European Commission relaunched the idea of a Common Consolidated Cor-
porate Tax Base (European Commission (2015a)). The respective proposals for a Council Directive 
have recently been published on 25 October 2016 (COM (2016) 683 and 685). The CCCTB promi-
ses a harmonized set of rules to determine the tax base, the consolidation of taxable profits at 
the EU level and formula-based apportionment. The CCCTB does not harmonize corporate income 
tax rates, which remain within the purview of the Member States.
 ͮ We support the idea of a CCTB to promote the harmonization of corporate income tax bases 
within the EU.
 ͮ We also support the idea of a two-step approach, i.e. harmonizing corporate tax bases and 
postponing consolidation and formula apportionment. A mandatory CCTB is clearly superior 
to an optional CCTB in terms of compliance and administrative costs as well as revenue 
consequences.
 ͮ The regulations laid out in the 2011/2016 proposal for a Council Directive provide a 
carefully prepared framework for a common tax base and are generally in line with the 
practices of EU Member States.
 ͮ The newly introduced elements such as the AGI, an R&D super-deduction and a temporary 
cross-border loss relief regime, however, narrow the tax base. Although these elements may 
improve the efficiency of tax systems in the EU, associated revenue losses might require an 
increase in tax rates. 
 ͮ Aligning anti-avoidance legislation reduces negative spill-overs for tax competition within 
the EU. Nonetheless, regarding tax competition with locations outside the EU, any anti-
avoidance legislation that increases the tax burden on profitable investments can have a 
negative effect on location decisions.
 ͮ Including profit consolidation and formula apportionment in a second stage eliminates 
profit shifting within the EU. At the same time, there is evidence that this could result in new 
discretion for tax planning, in particular with respect to factor allocation.
Key Messages
Action Plan for a Fairer 
and Efficient Corporate 
Tax System
The CCCTB was initially put forward in a Proposal for a Council Directive (COM (2011) 121/4) in 
2011 with the aim of reducing tax obstacles to an integrated European Market (European Com-
mission (2011)). 
In contrast to the 2011 Proposal for a Council Directive, the Commission now envisages a staged 
introduction of the CCCTB. More precisely, the first stage consists of a common corporate tax base 
(CCTB), while consolidation and formula apportionment – the reform element removing any incen-
tive for intra-EU profit shifting – are postponed to a later stage. Also different to the 2011 proposal, 
the 2016 proposal puts forward a mandatory application of the CCCTB for groups with total consoli- 
dated group revenue of more than EUR 750.000.000. With respect to the definition of the harmo-
nized tax base, changes to the 2011 proposal include an allowance for growth and investment (AGI) 
to address the tax discrimination of equity financing, a super-deduction for R&D costs, a temporary 
cross-border loss relief regime with recapture as well as specific anti-avoidance measures. 
The postponed second stage, i.e. consolidation and formula apportionment, provides for a fun-
damental switch from single entity taxation to unitary taxation of EU groups thus reflecting the 
growing relevance of multinationals’ cross-border activities and the EU as an integrated market. 
It raises, however, new issues such as potential tax competition on apportionment factors, re-
venue redistribution, and the responsibilities of local fiscal authorities.
2   The First Stage: CCTB Rules for Harmonizing  
the Corporate Income Tax Base in Europe
2.1   Comparative Analysis of the CCTB Proposal for  
Domestic Tax Accounting Practice
The Commission’s Proposal for a Council Directive (COM (2016) 683 and 685) provides a care-
fully prepared framework for a harmonized determination of corporate taxable income. A study 
conducted by EY, ZEW and the University of Mannheim compares tax base rules proposed by the 
2011 Proposal for Council Directive (COM (2011) 121/4) with prevailing corporate tax accounting 
regulations (as of 1 January 2011) and presents evidence on the extent of differences and simi-
larities (Spengel et al. 2012). Overall, the proposed rules are in line with commonly accepted 
principles of tax accounting. Nevertheless, for several Member States differences exist in the re-
cognition and measurement of provisions, in depreciation rates and methods, in capital gains 
taxation as well as in tax relief for losses. 
The CCTB also harmonizes anti-avoidance legislation. This is a reasonable step given the fact that 
elements removing intra-EU profit shifting, i.e. consolidation and formula apportionment are 
postponed to a later stage. The proposed rules are generally in line with country practice. Align-
ing the strictness of anti-avoidance legislation between the Member States reduces negative 
spill-overs for tax competition within the EU. Nonetheless, regarding tax competition with loca-
tions outside the EU any anti-avoidance legislation that increases the tax burden on profitable 
investments can have a negative effect on location decisions. The rules complement the EU ini-
tiatives to increase tax transparency, e.g. via country-by-country reporting.
One important advantage of a CCTB is the likely reduction of compliance and administrative costs 
in the medium and long term. In this context, a mandatory CCTB is clearly superior to an optional 
CCTB as proposed by the Draft Directive of 2011. According to the impact assessment of the re-
cent proposal, compliance cost savings of the CCTB amount to 10% in compliance time and 2.5% 
in compliance cost (SWD (2016) 342). 
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2.2 Quantitative Impact Assessment of a CCTB 
Spengel et al. (2012) quantify the change in effective tax burdens induced by the introduction of 
a CCTB in each of the 27 EU Member States for the fiscal year 2011. Calculations are based on 
the European Tax Analyzer, allowing tax base regulations to be modelled in great detail and thus 
making it easier to assess the timing effects of these regulations. The study does not quantify the 
impact of cross-border loss offset or any measure to counter the debt-bias or R&D super-deduc-
tions since these were not part of the 2011 Proposal for a Council Directive. The change in the 
EU-27 average tax burden caused by the remaining CCTB measures is rather small (-0.06%). This 
average effect hides more substantial tax consequences at the national level. The changes in ef-
fective tax burdens range from an increase of 3.12% in Romania to a reduction of 4.04% in Cy-
prus. In Germany and France, the average firm’s tax burden changes only slightly, decreasing by 
-0.16% and 0.15% respectively. With respect to the cross-country difference in effective tax bur-
dens, the distribution remains widely dispersed under a CCTB since profit tax rates are not har-
monized. The incentives for tax planning in terms of location decisions and profit shifting thus 
remain intact. The advantages of a pure harmonization of the tax base include increased trans-
parency, the elimination of qualification conflicts and the reduction of compliance costs. It is, 
moreover, a prerequisite for cross-border loss offset.
In Germany, these results are corroborated in a study commissioned by the German Federal Min-
istry of Finance. In this study, ZEW researchers investigated the impact of the CCTB Draft Directive 
of 2011 on the tax burden of a large sample of German corporations and tax revenue based on 
the microsimulation model ZEW TaxCoMM (Oestreicher et al. 2013). This study goes beyond ave-
rage tax effects and illustrates the heterogeneous impact a CCTB might have on firms with differ-
ent characteristics. The majority of firms experienced a reduction in tax payments. This is mostly 
attributed to the earlier deduction of allowances, especially the generous pool depreciation, which 
is now more restrictive in the current proposal. Firms making use of the German tax loss carryback 
regulations – not applicable under a CCTB – are likely to experience an increase in tax payments, 
especially if they have a below-average share of depreciable assets and provisions. 
3  A CCTB for the Systematic Removal of Debt Bias  
in Tax Systems?
In its action plan (COM (2015) 302), the EU Commission criticizes the way conventional tax sys-
tems distort financing decisions in favour of debt-financing. To address this shortcoming in a co-
ordinated way, the 2016 proposal for a CCTB (COM (2016) 683) includes a specific form of an al-
lowance for corporate equity (ACE), which is similar in scope to the Italian ACE regime. The 
proposed Allowance for Growth and Investment (AGI) provides an allowance for the increases in 
equity compared to a reference year while decreases are taxable.
The neutrality features of an ACE regime are compelling when it comes to financing and investment 
decisions (Hall and Jorgenson 1967, King 1984, Devereux et al. 2002). Addressing investment and 
financing distortions through the introduction of an ACE regime has also been recommended by the 
famous Mirrlees review on reforming the tax system for the 21st century and repeatedly by the Ger-
man Council of Economic Experts in the 2012 and 2015 editions of their annual economic report. 
Some countries introduced some variation of an ACE regime unilaterally (e.g. Belgium and Italy). 
The ACE in Belgium in particular triggered substantial revenue losses not only as a result of its 
narrowing of the tax base but also due to tax optimization schemes not being effectively targeted 
by anti-avoidance provisions (Zangari 2014). Consequently, many legislative measures (includ-
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ing the introduction of a new tax) were taken to limit budgetary costs. While the average equity 
ratio increased, evidence on positive aggregate investment responses do not seem clear cut (Prin-
cen 2012; Valenduc 2011). The design of the ACE regime in Italy, by contrast, limits revenue loss-
es by granting the allowance only on incremental equity and by implementing anti-avoidance 
rules targeting intra-group transactions. 
Against the background of convincing theoretical arguments coupled with revenue concerns, sev-
eral studies have assessed the ACE’s potential impact using simulations.
Spengel et al. (2015) analyze the impact of different systems on the removal of debt bias regard-
ing the cost of capital as well as effective marginal and effective average tax rates within the De-
vereux/Griffith (1999) framework. On average, in the EU the difference between the cost of capital 
for equity-financed investments as opposed to debt-financed investments amounts to 2.1 percent-
age points. This indicates a tax advantage for debt-financed investments. By granting a deduction 
for equity-financing, the cost of capital of equity-financed investments decreases. The AGI thus 
improves financing neutrality of corporate taxation. Nonetheless, the study also puts emphasis 
on the fact that perfect financing neutrality is not achieved when the notional interest rate differs 
from the relevant market interest rate. Moreover, under a revenue-neutral scenario, the Corporate 
Income Tax is shown to increase by 4.5 to 10 percentage points to compensate for the narrower 
tax base.
In a microsimulation study, Finke et al. (2014) provide an ex-ante analysis of an ACE tax regime in 
comparison with the German tax system of 2012. Taking behavioural responses into account, the 
study shows that the ACE regime with a profit tax rate increased by 6 percentage points triggered 
intensified outward profit-shifting activities and had a negative effect on location choices. In the 
long run, the tax revenue declines to about 88% of its original level. Since past reforms have shown 
that revenue neutrality is highly relevant for the policy-making process, this result points to a ma-
jor obstacle to broad political approval of ACE. Sensitivity analysis shows, however, that revenue 
losses can be reduced substantially if the ACE deduction is determined for the incremental change 
in equity only. The current AGI proposal envisages such an incremental design.
Applying an international general equilibrium model (CORTAX), De Mooij and Devereux (2011) study 
the trade-offs in ACE and CBIT tax regimes for Europe. They find that the ACE regime is welfare-im-
proving in all countries when tax rates are held constant. The ACE regime becomes welfare-reducing, 
however, when profit taxes are raised by 17 percentage points to offset the narrower tax base. A 
particularly noteworthy finding is that the coordinated introduction of the ACE reduces fiscal spillo-
vers from tax rate competition, mitigating the negative effects of financing an ACE regime through 
raised profit tax rates. 
To sum up, including an ACE type of regulation in the rules for a CCTB has advantages and disad-
vantages. It is certainly a systematic way to remove the debt bias and, as de Mooij and Devereux 
(2011) show, the coordinated introduction to some extent mitigates the concern that an ACE might 
be incompatible with international tax competition (Bond 2000). Still, the ACE regime introduces 
a revenue loss, putting pressure on the Member States to finance this loss. It also has repercus-
sions for personal income taxation as a consistent implementation would require the ACE to be 
made available to partnerships and private savers. It also requires interest and dividends to be 
taxed in the same way. 
Against this backdrop, incorporating an ACE element into the CCTB proposal might create addi-
tional tensions when it comes to finding political consensus on the CCTB due to the substantial 
revenue losses. In addition, as shown by the Belgium case, a system for neutrality financing can 
be exploited as a tax avoidance instrument in a cross-border setting (Hebous and Ruf 2015, Zan-
gari 2014). Hence, special attention should be paid to defining regulations to address the misuse 
of AGI in cross-border tax avoidance schemes. 
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Alternatively, the Member States can eliminate tax distortions in financing decisions outside 
the scope of the CCTB by reforming shareholder taxation along the lines of a dual income tax 
(Sørensen 2005). This regime has also been put forward as a reform proposal by the German 
Council of Economic Experts, the MPI and ZEW (2006).
4 The Second Stage: The Impact of a CCCTB
The second stage of the CCCTB proposal (COM (2016) 683) provides for a switch from the taxa-
tion of separate entities to unitary taxation, reflecting the growing relevance of multinational com-
panies. Consolidating profits at a group level and attributing the tax base to the subsidiaries’ 
countries of residence by a predefined formula removes the incentive for profit shifting within the 
EU. In addition, transfer pricing documentation, which eats up a fair deal of resources in busi-
nesses and fiscal administrations, would be obsolete within the EU under the CCCTB. According 
to the impact assessment conducted by the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, 
the CCCTB will increase investment by 3.4% and employment rates by 0.6% (COM (2016) 683, 
SWD (2016) 341). Despite existing empirical and theoretical evidence that firms might react to 
formula apportionment by re-allocating real production factors (e.g. Riedel 2010, Goolsbee and 
Maydew 2000, Nielsen et al. 2010), the study concludes that tax planning through factor shifting 
can be expected to be limited as non-tax arguments are thought to determine these choices. As 
the economic impact of the CCCTB is likely to depend on the tax responsiveness of the apportion-
ment factors, it thus seems worthwhile to assess this issue more explicitly when preparing for 
the introduction of the second stage. In addition, the European Commission clearly recommends 
that the formula should better align taxation with economic activity. Yet, intangible assets – im-
portant drivers of multinationals’ value creation – are not part of the formula. Excluding intangi-
bles avoids the difficult task of measuring intangibles, which makes it difficult to determine ap-
propriate transfer prices. However, this is also likely to induce a further redistribution of revenue 
away from knowledge economies. Finally, the current proposal refers to a one-stop-shop solution 
where the parent company (principal taxpayer) is accountable to one single tax administration in 
the parent’s residence country. Consequently, additional focus should be on ensuring the same 
standards of tax administration and tax enforcement in all Member States. If enforcement is weak-
er in some Member States than in others, be it strategically or due to a personnel shortage, there 
is an incentive to locate a group’s principal taxpayer in that jurisdiction.
5 Conclusion
By relaunching the CCCTB proposal, the EU Commission underscores its ambitions to fundamentally 
reform corporate taxation in the EU to address major shortcomings in today’s corporate tax systems. 
In view of the existing evidence on the effects of CCTB and CCCTB and the expected challenges of 
reaching a political consensus, favouring the CCTB as a first step is reasonable. The regulations de-
fining the CCTB as put forward in the proposal for a Council Directive provide a carefully prepared 
framework for harmonizing corporate taxable income and its rules are generally in line with country 
practice. Simulations for the 2011 proposal show that the expected changes in tax burdens follow-
ing the introduction of a CCTB can be expected to be moderate for most countries. The regulations 
addressing cross-border profit shifting are also very much in line with current country practice. 
The newly introduced elements such as the AGI, an R&D super-deduction and a temporary cross-
border loss relief regime, however, narrow the tax base. Although these elements may improve 
Removing Incentives for 
Profit Shifting within the EU
EU Commission Aims for  
a Fundamental Reform of 
Corporate Taxation
the efficiency of tax systems in the EU, existing studies show that revenue losses might be sub-
stantial and might need to be financed by tax increases. Tax increases, in return, have negative 
implications for the EU’s position in worldwide tax competition. Moreover, the introduction of an 
AGI is not convincing for two reasons: Firstly, the corporate debt bias should not be addressed at 
the corporate level (since such a step will interfere with Member States’ tax autonomy at the lev-
el of personal income tax) but rather at the level of personal income tax (since here, Member 
States can decide on their own). Secondly, the AGI as proposed by the Commission has some 
shortcomings in terms of its theoretical design, which need to be clarified.
Including profit consolidation and formula apportionment in a second stage eliminates profit 
shifting within the EU. At the same time, there is evidence that this will potentially lead to new 
discretion for tax planning in particular with respect to factor allocation thus affecting real eco-
nomic activities in the Member States. 
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